Evolving Al-Qaida still a threat

BEIRUT, Lebanon - Since Sept. 11, the militant network founded in the late 1980s by alleged terror mastermind Osama bin Laden has transformed itself from a centralized group into small, localized cells and affiliated groups, carrying out smaller-scale attacks. But experts say al-Qaida is still looking to carry off the next "big one" - an attack as deadly as the one on the World Trade Center.

Some call it al-Qaida 2.0, while others call it al-Qaida Lite.

By whatever label is in fashion, the militant group may be as deadly as ever. Five years after the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States, al-Qaida has transformed itself from a centralized group to a brand name used by assorted jihadist movements across the globe. The organization founded by Osama bin Laden in the 1980s has morphed into small, localized cells and affiliated groups that do not necessarily take orders from the old leadership. But it is clear they are inspired, if not specifically directed, by bin Laden.

Since Sept. 11, al-Qaida and its offshoots have carried out smaller-scale attacks, including the March 2004 bombings of four commuter trains in Madrid and the July 2005 transit bombings in London. But experts on militancy in the Middle East say al-Qaida also is looking to carry off the next "big one" - an attack as spectacular and deadly as those on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon - and last month's foiled plot to destroy U.S.-bound planes from London could be an example of that strategy. While the Bush administration claims its "war on terror" has seriously diminished al-Qaida's capabilities, the United States has failed to capture bin Laden and some evidence suggests his group or its allies have the means to carry out another large-scale attack.

Rapid adjustments

When the United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 to drive out the ruling Taliban movement that sheltered bin Laden and his deputies, al-Qaida was temporarily thrown off balance. But it quickly regrouped, dispersing its members, distributing its ideological tracts and terrorist techniques to a wider audience on the Web and encouraging new recruits to act autonomously under its banner.

"Bin Laden and al-Qaida were able to adapt better than the Americans," said Mohammad Salah, an expert on Islamic militancy at the pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat. "Today, al-Qaida no longer has a secure base of operations in Afghanistan like it did before September 11. But it doesn't need a base anymore. It can find recruits through the Internet and they can organize attacks on their own."

This transformation - from a hierarchical group toward an amorphous network that provides ideological direction and tactical support - was hinted at by bin Laden from the time he founded al-Qaida (Arabic for "the base") in the Afghan mountains in 1988. While the West views him as the world's top terrorist, he has long modeled himself on the 12th-century Muslim warrior Salahuddin, who liberated Jerusalem from the Crusaders. In his speeches and statements, bin Laden frames his legacy as that of a historic leader who inspired the world's Muslims to rise up against their Western-backed leaders and U.S. dominance in the Middle East.

"It no longer matters if a particular attack was organized by bin Laden or simply inspired by him," said Rifaat Sayed, an Egyptian expert on militants. "Bin Laden and al-Qaida will receive credit for the attack, and it will serve to motivate new recruits and inspire more attacks."

Even while in hiding since the United States invaded Afghanistan, bin Laden and his top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahri, have freely addressed their supporters through videos and Internet statements. They have inspired hundreds of young men to carry out suicide or conventional bombings in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Spain, Turkey and Britain.

The State Department reports more than 4,000 terror suspects worldwide have been arrested since 9/11. But other willing recruits replace those killed or captured. "Al-Qaida is able to regenerate much faster than the Americans are able to kill or arrest its followers," said Diaa Rashwan, a researcher on Islamic militants at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. "This happened when al-Qaida became a confederation of loosely affiliated cells instead of a centralized group under bin Laden's control."

Bin Laden and al-Zawahri are believed to be hiding in mountainous areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, probably under the protection of ethnic Pashtun tribes. They know the area well, having fought there in the 1980s during the CIA-sponsored jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

It is unclear how many of bin Laden's original followers - several thousand veterans of the Afghan jihad who joined al-Qaida or went through its training camps in the '90s - are at large. Many veterans of the Afghan war went on to fight and die in Islamic causes in Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere. Hundreds were detained in their home countries. And an unknown number have been killed or captured by the United States.

U.S. officials have scored some victories against al-Qaida, killing its military commander, Mohammed Atef, in a November 2001 air strike in Afghanistan. In June, a U.S. air strike killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. Working with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other allies, U.S. intelligence also has arrested several top al-Qaida leaders, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks.

'Willing to die for him'

While they might act independently, analysts say localized groups choose their targets based on al-Qaida's political priorities. In a series of letters and taped messages during the past five years, bin Laden and al-Zawahri provided their followers with a framework for carrying out new attacks. They urged strikes against U.S. interests and any other country with troops in Iraq or Afghanistan. They recommended attacking soft targets that have economic importance, such as mass transit systems, and timing attacks to coincide with key political events.

The Madrid and London attacks fit into bin Laden's call for adherents to strike at U.S. allies. And specialists say new recruits will adopt al-Qaida's hallmark method: simultaneous bombings against political or economic soft targets, designed to inflict heavy casualties and spread fear.

After five years of intense American pressure, experts and U.S. anti-terrorism officials thought al-Qaida no longer had the resources to mount large-scale attacks. But as the scope of the alleged plot broken up by British officials last month becomes clearer, that assessment might have to change.

The British conspiracy involved more plotters, extensive planning and greater technical skill than the Madrid and London bombings. It also could have caused far more casualties - hundreds and perhaps even thousands. If it turns out that top al-Qaida leaders were not involved directly and that the attacks were being planned by a local British group, then counterterrorism officials must deal with the possibility such cells can cause far greater damage than previously thought. The Madrid bombings killed 191 people; the London attacks killed 52, excluding the suicide bombers.

"It was assumed that small cells, acting independently, would cause limited damage with crudely designed explosives," said an Arab security official involved in monitoring militants. "But al-Qaida is disseminating expertise to make deadlier explosives through the Internet and by training a small number of people who could then teach others."